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INTRODUCTION 
 
Organisational, financial and regulatory conditions for Norwegian public transport 
have changed substantially over the past two decades. Operating subsidies in 
Norwegian conurbations, which is the responsibility of the county councils, have been 
reduced dramatically over a longer period followed by sharp increases in recent years. 
Changes in the Transport Act, which allowed for competitive tendering of public 
transport operations, were approved by the Government in 1991 and set in force in 
April 1994. 
 
Operators can compensate for subsidy reductions by reducing service levels, by 
increasing revenues or by cutting costs. This paper investigates how public transport 
operators have adapted to the new regulatory and financial conditions. Further, we 
present a “social welfare balance sheet” which includes the major costs and benefits 
of the developments in the public transport sector. Norheim and Renolen (1997) and 
Norheim and Carlquist (1999) developed a methodology for this, Fearnley and 
Carlquist (2001) expanded on their work and findings. This paper is a further 
elaboration of this series of analyses of urban public transport developments in 
Norway. It draws heavily on the latter reference, and is also in part based on the work 
of Vibe, Engebretsen and Fearnley (2005). 
 
This work concentrates on eight major Norwegian urban areas: Oslo, Akershus 
county, Drammen, Stavanger, Kristiansand, Bergen, Trondheim, and Tromsø, in the 
period 1986–2003, see Figure 1. Akershus county surrounds Oslo and together they 
make Greater Oslo. 
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Figure 1: The Norwegian cities of Oslo, Drammen, Stavanger, Kristiansand, Bergen, 
Trondheim, and Tromsø. 
 
 
1 METHODOLOGY 
 
The analyses presented here use data from TOI's Urban Public Transport database. 
The database describes supply, demand, financial aspects, area information and 
socioeconomic indicators at an aggregate level for every year and for each of the 8 
urban areas (7 cities plus Akershus county). Norwegian National Transport Statistics 
and the operators’ annual reports are the main data sources for the database. 
 
The introduction of the diesel duty in 1999 provided a challenge in the data validation 
process. In principle this fuel tax shall be reimbursed to bus companies, which means 
that it merely represents a shift in both operating costs and subsidies. In reality it has 
proven difficult to separate the fuel duty compensation from other transfers, and 
similarly to separate the diesel duty from other operating costs. On average the 
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compensation has been around 95% of the diesel duty paid. With these reservations 
we have made our best efforts to exclude costs and subsidies that relate to this tax. 
 
Some of the data that we use is confidential. In order to describe and compares trends 
for subsidies, costs, fare levels, supply and demand it has been necessary present them 
by way of indices, using 1986 as the base year. Indices make it easier to compare 
developments between areas that are different in many ways. The general problems 
with such indices are that they are very sensitive to the situation in the base year and 
that they do not provide any information of the actual levels. There are also problems 
with large fluctuations when the base level is very small. It has been necessary to 
leave out some observations either because they fluctuate too much or because there 
are weighty reasons to suspect they are wrong. "Average developments" are 
sometimes presented. When otherwise is not stated, these are unweighted. Weighted 
averages are very much dominated by Oslo, Akershus county and Bergen. Oslo alone 
represents for example more than 50 percent of all registered trips and about a third of 
route production in the eight areas. 
 
In order to understand passengers' behaviour we have developed three different 
aggregated demand models, which relate the number of trips per capita to various 
explanatory variables. The models are 1) a constant elasticity regression model which 
provides global "rule-of-thumb" elasticities; 2) an area-specific fare elasticity model 
which allows the price elasticity to vary between the cities; and 3) a dynamic model 
which can distinguish between immediate and long-run demand effects of changes in 
fares and service levels.  
 
The social welfare balance sheet compares public savings obtained from subsidy 
reductions with the costs that poorer service levels and higher fares incur on 
passengers and others. This is a relatively crude measure for the economic impact of 
the changes in the public transport sector. The approach is not a traditional cost-
benefit analysis. Rather, it is an annual summary of the impacts of the changes 
relative to the base year 1986. The costs and benefits include changes in subsidies, 
cost efficiency, and effects for passengers and others. 
 
 
 
2 TRENDS IN NORWEGIAN URBAN PUBLIC TRANSPORT 
 
Norwegian urban public transport in the period from 1986 to 2003 was characterised 
by steeply falling subsidies and decreasing costs up to 1997 followed by subsequent 
increases in subsidies and costs, decreasing patronage except in Oslo, increasing real 
fares, and stable supply.  
 
Reduced public transport subsidies: The period up to 1997 was one with substantial cuts in 
urban public transport subsidies. Subsidies have subsequently increased again. This is 
illustrated in figure 2. We see that 1997 is a momentum for a major policy shift. 
 
In total, the annual public transport subsidies in the 8 urban areas were reduced by 
around 20 percent from about NOK 1.5bn in 1986 to NOK 1.2bn in 2000, and 32% 
per vehicle kilometre. As a proportion of costs, subsidies fell from just under 50 
percent in 1986 to about one-quarter in 2000 (weighted average). However, there is 
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great variation between individual cities. With two exceptions (Kristiansand and 
Akershus) subsidies declined steadily till about 1997.  
 
Trondheim has had the largest subsidy cuts. By 2000 subsidies were down by an 
astonishing 97 percent, measured per vehicle kilometre. Bergen experienced a similar 
development until 1997, but has benefited from rising subsidy levels since. The 
subsidy reductions have rendered Bergen and Trondheim with subsidy levels that in 
2000 covered only 7 and 3 percent of operating costs, respectively. These levels place 
Trondheim and Bergen among the European cities with the lowest level of subsidies 
and the highest rates of farebox recovery. 
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Figure 2: Trends in subsidies as percentage of operating costs. 1986=1.00. The model 
is understood thus: If subsidies fall from 50% of costs in 1986 to 25% of costs in a 
given year, then the index will be 0.5 in that year. 
 
 
Cost efficiency gains and losses: Our analyses of operators’ productivity performance 
indicate that the potential for cost efficiency gains has been exhausted. Average costs 
per vehicle-kilometre fell by 14 percent between 1986 and 1997. Since then, average 
costs have increased again. See figure 3.  
 
The cost reductions in the early 1990s coincide with the changes in the Transport Act 
of 1991, which allowed for competitive tendering of public transport operations from 
1994, and which justified substantial cuts in public transport subsidies. As we see, the 
adjustments with cost savings started to accelerate even before the threat of 
competitive tendering became real from 1994 onwards.  
 
The developments in cost efficiency gains also coincide with the changes in subsidies. 
A preliminary analysis shows, however, that subsidies only to a very limited degree 
explain variations in costs. In other words there is little evidence of cost leakages if 
subsidies are increased, or that subsidy cuts alone will bring about efficiency gains. 
 
The change of trend in 1997 can have been brought about for several reasons. There is 
convincing evidence (se e.g. NTP 2003) that much of this cost increase after 1997 is 
related to the postponement of necessary investments in fleet and in infrastructure. 
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The efficiency gain and subsequent loss is therefore to some extent a result of public 
sector accounting principles. Another possible reason for the rapidly increasing costs 
after 1997 can be found in Atco (2001/2/3), who monitors the public transport 
tendering market. They find increasing costs of tendered bus services and see this in 
relation to declining competition for each tender. Fearnley and Carlquist (2001) listed 
increases in fuel prices and labour costs, rising passenger numbers, improved quality 
standards as possible explanations for the same shift. 
 
The overall conclusion is nevertheless that substantial gains were obtained in the early 
1990s - partly due to the disciplining effect of the threat of tendering, but definitely 
not as a result of subsidy cuts alone. The scope for further gains was exhausted and 
costs have increased sharply since the late 1990s. As a result, the average operating 
costs in 2002 lay only about 6 percent below the 1986 level. 
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Figure 3: Trends in operating costs per vehicle-kilometre. 1986=1.00.  
 
 
Major fare increases: Fare levels, calculated as the average farebox revenue per 
passenger trip, have increased steadily in most areas. In 2002 fare levels were on 
average 21 percent above the base year level in 1986. Bergen, which experienced 
major subsidy cuts, also experienced the largest fare increases: 57 percent in real 
terms. The only exception is Kristiansand where fare levels fell by about 20 percent. 
This is illustrated in Figure 4. 
 
If we consider the fare level as the price per passenger kilometre, rather than per trip, 
it is found that fares have not risen as dramatically in Bergen as it may seem from the 
first look at it. There is also a trend towards longer journeys, which due to the zonal 
system are more expensive. 
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Figure 4: Trends in fare levels, calculated as total fare box revenues divided by 
number of passengers. 1986=1.00.  
 
Supply has kept up with population growth: Supply, measured by mileage (vehicle 
kilometres), is in fact rising in line with increasing population. This means that the 
bus companies in the eight urban areas produced around 18% more vehicle kilometres 
in 2002 than in 1986, which is equal to the population growth. This service 
enhancement is a benefit to all passengers. Service levels fell in Bergen, Tromsø and 
Akershus during the period. 
 
Patronage is falling: On average demand (measured in passenger trips per capita) fell 
by 13% during the first 6 years of the period. See Figure 5. Since then demand has 
been quite stable in most areas.  
 
Oslo experienced a long period of sustained growth after 1992. One reason is that 
since the early 1990s service quality has increased substantially in Oslo, due to the 
integration of eastern and western metro networks and successful customer orientation 
schemes.  
 
In Bergen we see the adverse demand effects of service deterioration and fare 
increases, which add to the negative effects on public transport of a major road 
investment scheme in the 1990s. Patronage fell steadily during the entire period and 
lies around 30 percent below the 1986 base year level. These developments must also 
be seen in relation with the subsidy cuts in Bergen. 
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Figure 5: Passenger trips per capita. 1986=1.00.  
 
 
Profit margins are falling: Figure 6 illustrates the average developments in operating 
costs, operating revenues and subsidies, calculated per passenger kilometre. From the 
figure it is evident that the reductions in subsidies have caused deteriorating financial 
performances. Subsidies fell more rapidly than the improvements in revenues and 
costs. 
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Figure 6: Developments in revenue, cost and subsidy – all measured per vehicle-
kilometre. Averages of 8 urban areas, fixed prices. 1986 = 1.00. 
 
 
Volatile market conditions. The private car is often the most realistic alternative to 
public transport. The developments in car costs are therefore important determinants 
of public transport patronage. Figure 7 illustrates how petrol prices and public 
transport fares have developed since 1986. Both have increased in real terms, but the 
petrol price fluctuates far more than the public transport fare. Until year 2000 the 
relative prices developed in favour of public transport. A political decision to cut the 
"unreasonably high petrol taxes" in 2000 changed this picture. This decision is a 
likely explanation for the drop in public transport demand around that time. 
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Figure 7: Development in petrol price and average public transport fares. Fixed prices. 
1986=1.00 
 
 
 
3 AGGREGATE DEMAND MODEL 
 
Three different aggregate demand models have been applied to analyse the effects of 
income, fare levels, service, and petrol prices on demand for public transport. The 
main model is a constant elasticity model in first differences. We have calculated the 
following elasticities (table 1): 
 
Table 1: Elasticities for urban public transport in Norway. Dependent variable: 
Passenger trips per capita per year. 
Variable Elasticity
Income (GDP/capita) -0,39* 
Petrol price 0,12 
Fare -0,33 
Vehicle-km  0,44 
* Not significant at 5% level 
 
 
Our estimates fit relatively well with common assumptions about urban public 
transport in Norway. The fare elasticity estimate of about -0.3 is however somewhat 
lower than expected. The cross price elasticity with respect to petrol price confirms 
the fact that petrol tax cuts contributed to a drop in patronage around year 2000. 
 
Within our model, fare and service levels are the only explanatory variables that are 
controlled by the public transport sector. We have used this model to estimate the 
partial and combined effects of the changes in fare and service levels on demand. 
With the exception of Kristiansand, fare increases have caused declining demand in 
all cities. There is more variation in the effects of changing service levels. In some 
cities improved service levels have to some degree offset the negative effects of fare 
increases, whilst in others the combined action of deteriorating service levels and 
increasing fares have reduced demand even further.  
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Figure 8 shows how fares and service levels have influenced total demand for public 
transport in the 8 urban areas. It shows that relative to 1986 total demand in 2002 was 
reduced by about 8 percent as a combined result of changes in fares and service 
levels. This negative development adds to the negative effects of increasing household 
incomes and, in recent years, the falling petrol prices.  
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Figure 8: Effects on total demand of observed changes in fares and service levels in 8 
urban areas. 
 
 
In order extract more information from the data, and to obtain area-specific fare 
elasticity estimates, we specified a semi constrained model. In this kind model it is 
assumed that the demand elasticities of all other variables are the same in every area, 
and that only the fare elasticity varies between the areas. The model output is 
provided in table 2. 
 
Table 2: Constant elasticity model with area-specific fare elasticities. Dependent 
variable: Passenger trips per capita per year. 
Variable Elasticity 
Vehicle km 0,43 * 
Petrol price 0,12 * 
Income -0,03 
Fare:  
• Oslo -0,22 
• Akershus -0,12 
• Drammen -0,63 * 
• Kristiansand -0,42 * 
• Stavanger -0,33 * 
• Bergen -0,38 * 
• Trondheim -0,07 
• Tromsø -0,49 * 
* Significant at 10% level 
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There is a noticeable difference in price elasticity estimates between the areas. Three 
estimates are low and not significantly different from zero. Those are Oslo, Akershus 
and Trondheim. These low estimates correspond well with a previous study which 
found low fare elasticities in the Greater Oslo region (Hammer 1993), and with the 
general view that fare elasticities are lower in larger urban areas. However, the low 
and insignificant estimates may also point in the direction of other omitted variables 
which have had greater effect on demand. That could e.g. be changes in service 
quality. In sum the area-specific elasticities seem plausible and provide improved 
understanding of variation in demand effects in different urban areas. 
 
A third model specification is chosen in order to gain insight to the dynamics of 
demand. It is reasonable to assume that a proportion of the passengers are not able to 
respond immediately to a fare change. It takes time, for example, to change location 
of workplace or dwelling, to adjust car ownership and driving licence possession, or 
to change travel habits. These are examples of adjustments that may take years to 
materialise.  
 
A dynamic model helps understand this lagged adjustment in demand. A partial 
adjustment model is specified for this purpose. Table 3 shows the estimated short and 
long run elasticity estimates. Short run means here the effects that materialise within 
the same year, and long run means total effect. We shall use this model to show how 
long time the "long run" actually is. 
 
Table 3: Estimated short and long run elasticities  
Variable Short run elasticity Long run elasticity 
Veh.km 0,20 * 0,43 * 
Fare -0,23 * -0,51 * 
Income 0,07  
Petrol price 0,12 * 0,27 * 
* Significant at 5% level 
 
We can deduce from the table that long run effects are 2.2 times as large as the short 
run adjustments. This means that less than half the demand response can be observed 
within the year in which the changes take place. There is in other words considerable 
delay in passengers' response to changes in fares and service levels. 
 
The year by year demand effects of a thought fare increase of 10% in year 0 are 
shown in figure 9. The figure shows that the annual effect diminishes rapidly and after 
5 years there is no observable effect. The accumulated effect increases during the first 
couple of years and reaches its limit value of -5.1%, which is the estimated long run 
effect (since 10*(-0.51) = -5.1), after about 6 years. 
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Figure 9: Annual and accumulated demand effect of a 10% fare increase in year 0. 
 
 
4 SOCIAL WELFARE BALANCE SHEET 
 
The social welfare balance sheet describes the developments in the public transport 
sector over the period 1986 to 2003. Here, we compare subsidy savings with other 
changes in the sector. The balance sheet includes welfare effects (including marginal 
external costs) of modal shifts, changes in vehicle-mileage, service frequency, 
operating costs and fares. The net effect of these changes constitutes an indicator for 
social welfare changes. All prices are presented in NOKs, and converted into 1998 
values. In 1998 €1equalled approximate NOK 8.33. 
 
Quality improvements are not taken into consideration. Such effects are difficult to 
quantify. This is a limitation of our analysis, especially as quality measures can be 
seen as a consequence of subsidy reductions. Carlquist (1998) found that reduced 
subsidies have led to an increased average age of buses and may have had a negative 
impact on regularity, thus leading to deteriorating quality. On the other hand, subsidy 
cuts can have led to more market orientation and quality improvements. 
 
Several accumulation principles have been considered. In our analysis, all calculations 
are related to 1986 as the base year. E.g. if subsidies are NOK 50 million in 1986, 
NOK 25 million in 1987 and NOK 40 million in 1988, table 4 describes our 
accumulation principle: 
 
Table 4: Illustration of accumulation principle 
 1986 1987 1988 
Subsidy 50  25  40 
Change since 1986 0 -25 -10 
 
We also present a total accumulation, i.e. in the above example the total accumulated 
subsidy saving, related to 1986, would be (25+10)=35.  
 
For simplicity, all positive figures relate to savings or benefits, and all negative 
numbers are costs. 
 
The following sections discuss the components which are included in the analysis: 
• Savings from subsidy reductions (public purse savings) 
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• Savings in operating costs 
• Fare changes (costs for passengers) 
• Frequency change costs (waiting time) 
• External costs of modal shift to car and of increased supply  
These effects are summarised as a total welfare effect. 
 
Subsidy Changes. It is assumed that a reduction of subsidies (measured in fixed 
prices) equals an identical social welfare saving. We have not included shadow prices 
of public spending. Figure 10 shows the aggregate change in subsidies. The 
accumulate public purse saving over the entire period is NOK 5,7bn. 
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Figure 10: Savings of reduced operational subsidies to public transport 1986 – 2002. 
All figures relate to base year 1986. NOK in fixed prices. 
 
 
 
Operating Cost Savings. Operating cost savings are real efficiency gains. We see from 
figure 11 that up until 1997 there were considerable cost efficiency gains to be 
achieved in the urban bus markets. The total gain over the period is NOK 2.5 billion. 
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Figure 11: Aggregate savings of reduced operational subsidies to public transport 
1986 – 2002. All figures relate to base year 1986. NOKs in fixed prices. 
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Fare Increases. If savings from subsidy reductions lead to an equal fare increase, 
social welfare is unchanged although the financing burden has been transferred from 
the public purse to the passengers. Thus, once subsidy is included in the balance sheet, 
then user payments must be included as well. We have calculated the costs for 
existing passengers in a given year, due to real fare increases (measured by revenue 
per trip) as compared to 1986. We have assumed that a NOK 1 fare increase reduces 
passengers' welfare by NOK 1. Figure 12 shows the aggregate change in user 
payments. The total welfare effect is negative: -NOK .8bn. There is no sign of any 
direct effects of the shift in subsidies on fare levels. 
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Figure 12: Changes in user payments 1986 – 2002. All figures relate to base year 
1986. NOK in fixed prices. 
 
 
 
Modal Shift and Increased Bus Supply. Service and fare level changes will influence 
demand for public transport, and therefore also car traffic. Increased car traffic 
involves a number of external costs. Eriksen, Markussen and Pütz (1999) studied 
marginal external costs of transportation. Their figures include global and local 
pollution, noise, congestion, accidents and infrastructure wear. Our definition of 
social welfare thus includes environmental costs. A more thorough analysis would 
have to consider the proportion of peak to off-peak traffic. Fearnley and Nossum 
(2004) analysed transfers from use of private car to public transport. For 11 major 
urban areas they found that the average proportion of new passengers that originally 
used a private car was 42.7%. It is therefore assumed that 42.7% of all new 
passengers previously travelled by private cars, and similarly that 42.7% of patronage 
reductions are lost to private cars.  
 
Our analysis includes the changes in patronage which are caused by changes in fares 
and bus service levels only. The aggregate demand model is used to estimate this. 
Thus the analysis includes only factors within the operators’ range of control.  
 
It has been difficult to make good calculations for the change in public transport 
vehicle kilometres that are caused by demand changes. We have chosen to include 
external costs of the entire production increase. The reason for this is that we do not 
know, based on the aggregated figures, how many passengers a departure must lose in 
 14 
order for the departure to be withdrawn. There is no clear pattern in the data. 
However, the data indicate that supply is relatively unchanged despite demand 
changes. This may also explain why kilometre production per capita on average has 
been fairly constant despite fall in demand. Therefore we have assumed that the cost 
of transferred traffic from public transport to the private car is merely the cost per new 
car kilometre, and that the public transport production will be maintained. This 
assumption may be incorrect for individual cities, but seems realistic for the seven 
cities aggregated. 
 
Increased bus mileage has caused external costs that sum up to NOK623 million over 
the period. Modal shift from public transport to private car has caused a similar 
welfare loss of NOK572. The total "external cost" of the changes is therefore a 
welfare loss of about NOK 1.2bn. 
 
Waiting Time Changes. A less frequent service implies longer waiting times and 
therefore costs for passengers. There are several problems concerning these 
calculations, which need to be mentioned. One is the introduction of service lines for 
the elderly and disabled. This yields a less frequent service on average, but on the 
other hand average walking distance will decrease. Another weakness is that 
frequency estimations based on network kilometre per vehicle hour, and travel 
surveys showed quite different patterns. This might be due to inadequate sample size 
for the surveys, or that the network kilometre data was unreliable. Despite these 
weaknesses, we have included this component as there are substantial variations 
between the cities and we believe we have identified the direction of change for the 
cities. We have applied a valuation of waiting time of NOK 0.384 per minute 
(Nossum 2003 – converted into 1998 values). There is great variation in the changes 
in waiting times both between the areas and over time. In some periods waiting time 
has increased and in other periods it has been reduced. The accumulated effect of 
changes in waiting time is negative but small; minus NOK 309m. 
 
Total social welfare effects. Table 5 summarises the welfare effects over the period 
1986 to 2003. The figures are split between cities and between types of impact. 
 
 
Table 5: Accumulated costs and benefits/savings in NOK millions over the period 
1986 to 2003 in the eight urban areas. Positive figures are welfare gains; negative are 
costs. 
Welfare effects of: 
Os
lo 
Ak
er
sh
us
 
Dr
am
me
n 
Kr
ist
ian
sa
nd
 
St
av
an
ge
r 
Be
rg
en
 
Tr
on
dh
eim
 
Tr
om
sø
 
Su
m 
Change in subsidy 4 457 -1 066 183 -97 -155 987 1 255 131 5 694 
Change in cost efficiency 682 -468 -1 234 128 779 1 069 125 2 548 
Change in user payments -4 364 -1 877 143 58 -91 -544 -391 -125 -7 193 
Change in waiting time -133 392 -194 -229 59 n/a 146 267 309 
External cost of buss mileage -294 -69 78 -96 -121 -27 -72 -23 -623 
External cost of shift to car -162 -244 -27 24 -5 -123 -15 -19 -572 
Total Social welfare 185 -3 332 182 -107 -186 1 073 1 992 355 163 
 
The single largest effect in the balance sheet is the inclusion of Akershus, which 
brings in large welfare losses. Akershus County has been severely affected by new 
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requirements for school transport, which is costly to produce and which necessitates 
large subsidies. Therefore, despite increased subsidies and increased user payments, 
Akershus has only provided marginal user benefits in terms of service enhancements 
(waiting time gains). 
 
We also see that Oslo has had the largest subsidy cuts, totalling NOK 4.5bn, which 
almost entirely can be said to have been transferred to passengers who have paid an 
extra NOK 4.4bn over the period. Similar, but far smaller transfers of costs from the 
public to the passengers can be seen in Drammen, Bergen, Tromsø and to some extent 
in Trondheim.  
 
Nearly all the urban areas have experienced cost efficiency gains and at the same time 
considerable external costs of increased bus mileage and car use. 
 
Only three of the areas have negative total effects and only Akershus has had 
substantial welfare losses during the period. Bergen, Trondheim and Tromsø on the 
other hand stand out with considerable welfare gains.  
 
Fearnley and Carlquist (2001) showed that in the first half of the period 1986-99 there 
was a substantial saving due to reduced subsidies, but almost three quarters of this 
was offset by other components, in particular transfer of costs to passengers 
(increased fares). In the second half of the period, the possibility to reduce subsidies 
was more limited, most likely because the potential for cost efficiency gains was 
diminishing, they argued. The fares rose substantially, and the external costs of 
increasing production also increased. This led to a net loss in the second period, 
according to them. Their conclusions go well with figure 13, which illustrates the 
annual total welfare effects in the 8 urban areas. 
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Figure 13: Total annual welfare effect of changes in subsidies, cost, user payments, 
waiting time and external effects in the eight urban areas and with Oslo/Akershus 
excluded. All figures relate to base year 1986. NOK in fixed prices. 
 
 
Greater Oslo (Oslo and Akershus) represents more than 50% of the population in the 
eight urban areas studied. In addition, Oslo has a public transport system comprising 
bus, tram and metro networks, whereas the other cities with small exceptions have bus 
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systems only. If we separate Greater Oslo from the six other cities, we see from figure 
10 that the same pattern as for all the areas materialises. However, after 1997 Oslo 
and Akershus sustained severe welfare losses as opposed to only moderate losses in 
the other six cities. 
 
In total, and given the reservations presented, there seems to be a positive relationship 
between subsidy cuts and social benefit. Although subsidy cuts have meant a 
considerable transfer of cost to the passengers, there has also been the disciplining 
effect on operating costs during the period up to 1997. This conclusion is in part 
contrary to previous studies of the developments of Norwegian urban public transport 
by Norheim and Carlquist (1999) and Fearnley and Carlquist (2001). The latter 
concluded more vaguely that "savings for the public purse due to subsidy reductions 
will be offset by changes which in part are due to the subsidy reductions".  
 
 
 
5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
We have studied trends and developments in Norwegian urban public transport in the 
period 1986 to 2003. Previous studies have shown a long lasting trend of diminishing 
subsidies to urban public transport. This trend has changed and total subsidies have in 
fact increased steadily and rapidly since 1997. Despite this, fare levels continue to 
increase. Therefore, considerably more resources have gone into urban public 
transport in the last couple of years. Part of this extra money is assumingly financing 
necessary maintenance costs and investments that were postponed due to the strained 
situation caused by subsidy cuts. 
 
The data has enabled us to develop relatively robust estimates of demand elasticities. 
The overall fare and service elasticities are estimated to -0.33 and 0.44 respectively. 
And area-specific fare elasticity model indicates that the size of the elasticity is 
inversely related to the size of the city. Larger cities seem to have less price sensitive 
demand. A dynamic model shows that the total effects of changes in fare or service 
levels are about 2.2 times as large as the within-year effect; there is considerable delay 
in passengers' response. 
 
In particular because of rapidly increasing fares, public transport patronage has fallen 
steadily during the period. The demand model shows that changes in fare and service 
levels have caused a passenger loss of about 8 percent. 
 
Our analyses of operators’ productivity performance indicate that the potential for 
cost efficiency gains has been exhausted. Average costs per vehicle-kilometre fell 
between 1986 and 1997. Since then, average costs have increased again and are 
approaching the 1986 level. A likely reason for the cost reductions in the 1990s is the 
threat of tendering which disciplined operators and forced them to prove that they 
delivered value for money even without competition. 
 
The public purse savings from reduced subsidies in seven Norwegian cities have had 
consequences for other actors. The operators have become more cost effective, 
although probably mostly because of the disciplining effects of competition. This 
indicates that it was “correct” to reduce subsidies. The passengers have carried the 
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brunt of the cost transfer, mainly through increased fares but also through reduced 
service quality. Society in general has also had to bear costs due to a modal shift from 
public transport to private car traffic. 
 
The year 1997 has been a momentum for noticeable shifts in trends with respect to 
subsidies and operating costs. The developments since 1997 are dramatic. Social 
welfare declines rapidly as a joint effect of increases in subsidy payments, operating 
costs and fares. Public transport costs seem to be escalating, although a major reason 
for this is the new requirements for school transport in one area. 
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